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Résumé:  Nous nous proposons d'étudier l'impact que le sentiment anti-immigrés de certains électeurs 
est susceptible d'avoir sur les propositions que font les partis en matière de politique 
économique. Nous modélisons la compétition électorale comme ayant lieu entre trois partis 
(la Gauche, la Droite et l'Extrême-Droite) et portant essentiellement sur deux dimensions (la 
taille du secteur public et l'immigration). Nous " calibrons " le modèle en utilisant des 
données d'enquêtes menées durant les années d'élections présidentielles 1988 et 2002, et 
montrons que l'influence des questions liées à l'immigration sur la taille du secteur public est 
loin d'être négligeable. 
 
Abstract:  We study the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments among voters on the equilibrium position of 
political parties on the economic issue.  We model political competition as taking place 
among three parties (Left, Right, and Extreme Right) on a two-dimensional policy space 
(economic issue, immigration issue) using an extension of the Party Unanimity Nash 
Equilibrium concept. We "calibrate" the model to French survey data for the election years 
1988 and 2002, and show that the immigration issue influences equilibrium on the economic 
issue in a significant way. 
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Anti-immigrant feeling (xenophobia) among voters has been proposed as a key factor 
explaining why, in the 2002 French national election, Jean Le Pen’s National Front Party 
won second place.  Here, we study the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments among voters 
on the equilibrium position of political parties on the economic issue, which we take to be 
the size of the public sector.  More specifically, we will study two channels through 
which anti-immigrant voter sentiment can alter the equilibrium party platforms on the 
issue of public-sector size.  First, there is a direct effect which we call the anti-solidarity 
effect (ASE):  to the extent that voters dislike immigrants, and believe that immigrants 
exploit the welfare state, they may desire to decrease the generosity of state benefits. The 
second effect is indirect.  Suppose that a voter is very xenophobic, although quite 
moderate on the issue of public sector size: she may vote for a xenophobic party if the 
immigration issue is sufficiently important for her, even if that party is more right-wing 
on the size of the public sector than she is.  If there are many voters of this kind, then 
parties that want large cuts in the size of the public sector may gain large support.  We 
call this the policy-bundle effect (PBE).  Our objective in this analysis will be to 
decompose the total effect of xenophobia on equilibrium values of party policy on public-
sector size into these two effects. 
We model political competition using an extension of the Party Unanimity Nash 
Equilibrium (PUNE) concept (Roemer, 2001).  In this model, the parties are each divided 
into two factions – an Opportunist faction and a Militant faction.   The Opportunist 
faction wishes, in the party competition game, to propose a policy that will maximize the 
party’s vote share.  The Militant faction wishes to propose a policy that will maximize the 
average welfare of party’s voters (where each party’s constituency is endogenously 
determined).  The idea of PUNE is that parties compete against each other strategically, 
as in Nash equilibrium, and factions bargain with each other, inside parties. The 
proposals that parties consist of bargaining factions captures the view that parties have 
conflicting goals: to represent constituencies, and to win office, or, more generally, to 
maximize vote share.  Mathematically, the virtue of the factional model of parties is that 
it engenders the existence of political equilibria when policy spaces are multi-





































We model political competition as taking place among three parties (Left, Right, and 
Extreme Right) on a two-dimensional policy space (public sector size, immigration 
issue). We “calibrate” the model to French survey data for the election years 1988 and 
2002, and show that politics have changed significantly over this period, from being 
centered primarily on economic issues to being centered on non-economic issues such as 
the immigration and security / law and order.  We estimate that in 2002, the effect of 
voter xenophobia was to reduce the voters’ choice of public-sector size between 7% and 
51% of one standard deviation of the population’s distribution of public-sector size ideal 
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1. Introduction 
The 2002 French presidential election
1 led to an expected (and, to many, 
appalling)  run-off election between  Jacques Chirac – conservative incumbent – and 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the  “Front National”, a nationalistic and xenophobic law-
and-order movement. Lionel Jospin, socialist and former prime minister,  came in third 
place on the first round and so could not take part in the run-off election. 
  Many explanations were offered ex post to account for the presence of an 
Extreme-Right candidate on the second round of the French presidential election. Some 
referred to the very high number of candidates -- sixteen were vying for the presidency – 
that made  coordination among voters (which might have prevented the Le Pen debacle) 
more difficult.  Most commentators advanced the traditional parties’ failure to  respond 
adequately to the increasing anti-immigrant sentiment among the native citizenry, and to 
their expectations in terms of law and order policies, together with a general mistrust 
towards older traditional parties.    
  Our concern in this article is with the effect that increasing French anti-immigrant 
sentiment among voters will have on the size of the welfare state, as the latter is 
determined through political competition.   For the purposes of this article, we will often 
describe anti-immigrant feeling as xenophobia. Ours is not a sociological or 
psychological investigation; we observe the distribution of xenophobic views based on 
voter survey data, and do not inquire into their causes or possible justifications. We will 
argue that the size of the welfare state and the government’s position on immigration are 
among the most important issues in contemporary French politics.  Political parties put 
forward positions on both these issues, and voters choose among parties based on their 
preferences on the two issues.  We will model the political game among these parties, and 
then ask: How would the equilibrium values of the parties’ positions on the size of the 
public sector change, were voters less xenophobic?  We will attempt to answer the 
                                                 
1 The French presidential election is a two-round vote. If a candidate gets at least 50% of 
the votes in the first round, she gets elected. If no candidate gets at least 50% of the score, 
the first two candidates meet in a second round. Who gets the majority of the votes in this 





































question by computing what the equilibrium in political competition would deliver, with 
regard to the size of the public sector, were the distribution of voter xenophobic attitudes 
different from what it is. 
  It is conceptually useful to distinguish between two ways in which anti-immigrant 
voter sentiment can alter the equilibrium party platforms on the issue of public-sector 
size.  First, there is a direct effect which we call the anti-solidarity effect (ASE):  to the 
extent that voters dislike immigrants, and believe that immigrants exploit the welfare 
state, they may desire to decrease the generosity of state benefits. A similar argument is 
put forward by Alesina et al. (2001) to explain large differences in welfare programs 
between the US and Europe: in the US, racism and prejudices against the Black minority 
may reduce the demand for redistribution expressed by white citizens. 
  The second effect is indirect.  Suppose that a voter is very xenophobic, although 
quite moderate on the issue of public sector size: she may vote for a xenophobic party if 
the immigration issue is sufficiently important for her, even if that party is more right-
wing on the size of the public sector than she is.  If there are many voters of this kind, 
then parties that want large cuts in the size of the public sector may gain large support.  
We call this the policy-bundle effect (PBE).  It is a political portfolio effect, a 
consequence of the bundling of issues. 
  Our analysis will enable us to decompose the total effect of xenophobia on 
equilibrium values of party policy on public-sector size into these two effects.  
  The present paper is part of a larger project – including also Woojin Lee -  which 
aims to study the potential impact of xenophobia or racism on distribution in a number of 
countries and to draw some international comparisons. For results on the US, see Roemer 
and Lee (2004); for results on Denmark, see Roemer and Van der Straeten (2004). This 
project is part of the emerging literature linking distribution to racial or immigration 
issues, see for example Alesina et al. (2001), Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2003) or 
Ortega (2004a, 2004b). 
  Before turning to a description of our data and of the major political issues in the 
campaigns, we briefly present below the various political parties competing  in the  
presidential elections, together with their vote shares. The tables A1, A2 and A3 in the 





































years 1988, 1995, and 2002.  We will describe French politics in terms of broader 
coalitions : Left, Right and Extreme Right. The composition of the coalitions is given in 
the Appendix tables referred to above.  We compute the broader parties’ vote shares by 
summing the vote shares on the parties forming the coalition; see Table 1. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
The Extreme Right movement, whose main leader is Jean-Marie Le Pen, increased its 
vote share by almost 6 percentage points between 1988 and 2002, whereas the Left 
coalition lost about 6 percentage points. 
 
  Our data consist of micro-data from the Post-Electoral Survey 1988, the Post-
Electoral Survey 1995, and French Electoral Panel 2002
2. These surveys include  
- demographic questions: age, sex,…,  
                                                 
2 The CEVIPOF post electoral survey 1988 was produced by the CEVIPOF, and carried 
out by SOFRES. It took place just after the 1988 presidential election, between May 9th 
and May 20th, and includes 4,032 respondents representative of the French population 
above 18 (non-registered voters were excluded).  The CEVIPOF post electoral survey 
1995 was produced by the CEVIPOF, and carried out by SOFRES. It took place just after 
the 1995 presidential election, between May 8th and May 23rd, and includes 4,078 
respondents representative of the French population above 18 and registered on electoral 
lists. The data of the French electoral panel 2002 (PEF2002) were produced by the 
CEVIPOF, the CIDSP, the CECOP with the support of the ministry of Interior, the FNSP, 
and the University of Montreal. This electoral study took place in three waves between 
April and June 2002 carried out by TN-SOFRES. It includes 10,138 interviews, 4107 in 
the first wave carried out before the first round of the presidential election between April 
8th and April 20th, 4017 interviews after the second round between May 15th and May 
31st, and 2013 after the legislative elections between June 20th and 28th. All these data 
are available at the Socio-Political  Data Archive (CIDSP). The results and interpretation 






































- questions about social and financial position: marital status, income, labor status, 
- questions about voting behavior, party preferences, determinants of the vote, …  
- questions about economic or social issue: taxation, economic policies, law and order, 
immigration... 
 
In order to asses the relative importance of the various issues in explaining voters’ choice 
of a party on election day, we first present a brief overview of the 1995 and 2002 




For the year 1995, we rely on the following question: 
 
Question : Here are a number of problems that France has to face nowadays. On a scale 
from 0 to 10, could you give a score to each of these problems, according to the 
importance it had in deciding  your vote in the first round of the presidential election? 
The place of France in the world, security of persons, social protection, immigration, 
purchasing power and wages, education of the youth, unemployment, sharing of working 
time, European construction, environment, AIDS, corruption, exclusion.  
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the answers. The first column reports the percentage of respondents who 
give each mentioned issue one of the two highest values on the 0-10 scale; the second 
column reports the percentage of respondents who give one of the lowest three values. 
The third column gives the average score, and column 4 the standard deviation. Problems 
are ranked by average score. 
Unemployment appears to be the most important issue, with an average score of 
8.9; almost three quarters of the respondents give it a score of 9 or 10. Education of 
                                                 





































youth, social protection, and exclusion come next. Immigration appears only in the 
bottom half of the table.  
 
For year 2002, we use the following question. 
 
Question: Among the following problems, which will be the most important when you 
decide how to vote? Pollution, unemployment, immigration, social inequalities, political 
scandals, delinquency, conditions in schools, pensions, European construction, fight 
against terrorism, sovereignty of France, tax cuts. Which is the second most important 
problem, third most important problem?  
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 shows that the single most important problem is unemployment: one third 
of the respondents rank it as the  most important problem, and almost two thirds of the 
respondents rank it as one of the three most important problems.  The second most often 
cited problem is delinquency,  the third is social inequalities. Immigration appears fourth; 
it is mentioned by 18% of the respondents as one of the three most important problems.  
Thus, as in  1995, unemployment is still the most important issue; however, law and 
order and immigration issues have become more salient to voters over the period. 
Assuming that unemployment, education and social inequalities are mainly 
questions about the size of the public sector, modeling  political competition as focusing 
upon the two issues of  public- sector size and  immigration / law and order issues 
appears to be an acceptable abstraction. 
 
2. Political equilibrium: Theory 
  We propose that the spectrum of political parties can be captured, for our 
purposes, with a model that postulates three parties: a Left, a Right, and an Extreme 
Right.   The Left party of the model will correspond to the union of four or six parties; the 
Right will correspond to the union of three parties; the Extreme Right will correspond to 





































model of political equilibrium in which three parties compete on a two- dimensional 
policy space, which, in our application will be the size of the public sector and the policy 
towards immigrants.    
The model is an extension of party unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous 
parties (PUNEEP) as defined in Roemer (2001, Chapter 13).  
  The data of the model consist of the information (H,F,T,v,n) where: 
•  H is a space of  voter types equipped with a probability distribution F; 
•  is the utility function of a voter type defined on the policy space T, and  v(⋅,h)
•  n is the number of parties. 




•  (L,R,ER) is a partition of the set of voter types into party memberships or 
constituencies: 
•    L∪R∪ ER = H, L∩R = ∅, L∩ ER = ∅, R∩ ER = ∅ 
•  τ
J ∈ T is the equilibrium platform of party J, for J=L,R,ER. 
There will be no confusion if we refer to a party and its constituency by the same 
variable: e.g, ER for Extreme Right.   
For our application, a voter’s type will be an ordered pair (π,ρ) where π is the 
voter’s ideal public sector size (which we sometimes call, for short, her ‘tax rate’) and ρ 
is her position on the immigration issue.   The policy space T is a set of ordered pairs 
(t,r), which we may take to be the real plane, where t is a party’s policy on the size of the 
public sector and r is its policy on immigration.   The utility function of the polity is a 
function  v :T × H → °   given by 
  v(t,r;π,ρ) =− (t −π)
2 −γ(r− ρ)
2 .    (2.1) 
We refer to γ as the relative salience of the immigration issue, and assume it is the same 
for all voters. 
 Given  three  policies  (τ
L,τ
R,τ





ER), for J=L,R,ER,  as the fraction of the polity who prefer the policy of party 
J to the other two policies.  In our model, if the policies are distinct, then the set of voters 
indifferent between two policies will always have F-measure zero, and so, in the case of 





































  Unlike the model of Downs, in our model, parties will generically propose distinct 
policies in equilibrium.   
  We briefly review the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE).  A 
party possesses entrepreneurs or organizers, and members or constituents.  The members 
of a party are citizens who, in equilibrium, prefer that party’s policy to the policies of the 
other parties.  The party will also represent its members, as we describe below.   The 
entrepreneurs are professional politicians who make policy in the party.   Think of them 
as a very small group of individuals, who are not identified with citizens characterized by 
a type.  (Their type is irrelevant.) We will assume that the organizers of the Left and 
Right parties are each divided into two factions – an Opportunist faction and a Militant 
faction.   The Opportunist faction wishes, in the party competition game, to propose a 
policy that will maximize the party’s vote share.  The Militant faction wishes to propose a 
policy that will maximize the average welfare of the party’s constituency.     
  The proposal that parties consist of bargaining factions captures the view that 
parties have conflicting goals: to represent constituencies, and to win office, or, more 
generally, to maximize vote share.  Mathematically, the virtue of the factional model of 
parties is that it engenders the existence of political equilibria when policy spaces are 
multi-dimensional. 
  We will assume that the Extreme Right party is a passive member of the party –
competition game: it proposes a fixed policy, which could be viewed as the ideal policy 
of its organizers.  Modeling the Extreme Right in this way is less than ideal: we would 
have preferred to model it as a party with factions that behave in the manner of the other 
two parties.   Doing so, however, immensely complicates the computation of equilibrium 
–already a time-consuming task—and so we have elected to treat the policy it proposes as 
exogenously given.  Its membership, however, will be endogenous. 
  Without loss of generality, we could postulate a third faction in each of the L and 
R parties – a Reformist faction, whose members desire to maximize the average expected 
welfare of the party’s constituency.  (The expectation comes about because there is 
uncertainty concerning which party will win the election.   Of course, in a three-party 
model, there is also uncertainty concerning the government coalition.)   As is shown in 





































appropriate sense,  the Reformists are a ‘convex combination’ of the other two factions.  
Therefore we have dispensed with it, and also with having to define the probability of 
victory, which would be essential, were we have to discuss expected utility of voters, 
something of concern to Reformists. 
  We mention the Reformists because postulating their existence adds an important 
element of realism to the model, although, it turns out, it does not alter the model’s 
equilibria.   Thus, from the formal viewpoint, we may ignore Reformists
4. 
  The idea of PUNE is that parties compete against each other strategically, as in 
Nash equlibrium, and factions bargain with each other, inside parties.  At an equilibrium, 
each party’s platform is a best response to the other parties’ platforms in the sense that it 
is a bargaining solution between the party’s factions, given the platforms proposed by the 
other parties.   In our application,  this will be the case for the L and R parties. 
  Suppose the members of a party consist in all citizens whose types lie in the set 
J ⊂ H.   We define the average welfare function for this party as a function mapping  T 
into the real numbers defined by : 
  V
J(τ) = v(τ;h)dF(h)
h∈J ∫  .    (2.2) 
That is, V
J(τ)  is just (a constant times) the average utility of the coalition J at the policy 
τ.   For (2.2) to make sense, we must assume that the utility functions v are unit-
comparable. 
  
Definition A party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) for the model (H,F,T,v,3) at the 
exogenous ER policy τ
ER is : 
  (a) a partition of the set of types H = L∪R∪ ER,  possibly ignoring a set of 
measure zero; 




                                                 
4 The reader may be puzzled that adding the Reformist faction does not change the 
equilibrium set.  Adding them does change something, however: the interpretation of the 
bargaining powers of the factions associated with particular equilibria.  Thus, we do not 





































(1a)  Given (τ
L,τ












with at least one of these inequalities strict; 
(1b) Given (τ
R,τ












with at least one of these inequalities strict; 
(2) for J=L,R,ER,  every member of coalition J prefers policy τ
J to the other two policies, 
that is h ∈ J ⇒ v(τ
J,h) > v(τ
′  J ,h) for  ′  J  ≠ J. 
  
  Condition (1a) states that, when facing the policies τ
ER and τ
L, there is no feasible 
policy that would increase both the average welfare of party R’s constituents and the vote 
fraction of party R.  Thus, we may view policy τ
R  as being a bargaining solution between 
party R’s two factions when facing the oppositions’ policies, as the Militants’ desire to 
maximize the average welfare of constituents, and the Opportunists desire to maximize 
vote share.     All we employ here is the assumption that a bargain must be Pareto 
efficient for the two players in the bargaining game.  Condition (1b) similarly states that 
policy τ
L is a bargaining solution for party L’s factions when facing the policies τ
ER and 
τ
R.  Condition (2) states that the endogenous party memberships are stable: each party 
member prefers her party’s policy to the other parties’ policies. 
  There are two ‘free’ parameters in this equilibrium concept: one might think that 
the relative strength of the Militants with respect to the Opportunists in a party is an 
important variable, in determining where on the mini-Pareto frontier of the factions the 
bargaining solution lies.   There is one such parameter for each party L and R.  Thus, we 
can expect that, if there an equilibrium, there will be a two-parameter manifold of 
equilibria, where the elements in this manifold are associated with different pairs of 
relative bargaining strengths of the pairs of factions in L and R.  This indeed turns out to 
be the case, as we will see below. 
  With differentiability, we can characterize a PUNE as the solution of a system of 










































with respect to the policy τ
J.   Denote by ∇V
J  the gradient of V
J.    Then, we can write 
the necessary conditions for a PUNE where τ
L and τ




















L)      
(FOC) 








Condition (1a) says that the gradients of the vote share function and the average welfare 
function for party L point in opposite directions at the solution, and so, assuming local 
convexity, there is no direction in which the policy of the party can be altered so as to 
increase both the party’s vote share and the average welfare of the party’s constituents.    
Thus conditions (1a) and (1b) correspond exactly to the conditions (1a) and (1b) in the 
definition of PUNE.  (All policies are interior in our application, since T is an open set.) 
  Our next task is to characterize PUNE as a system of equations, which requires us 









































a .    (2.4) 
We will specify the value of the policy r so that larger r means more xenophobic (anti-
immigrant).   Thus, at equilibrium, we will expect that r
L < r
R < r
ER.   For an equilibrium 
with this characteristic, it follows from (2.3) that the constituency L will be precisely: 





for these are the types who will prefer policy τ
L to both other policies.   In like manner, 
we have: 





and R , of course, comprises the remaining types (except for a set of measure zero).   In 
short-hand, if we define: 




















































and we denote the vector consisting of all three policies as τ, then we have:
 
L ={(π,ρ)|ρ < m(τ,π)}, R ={(π,ρ)|m(τ,π) < ρ < M(τ,π)}, ER ={(π,ρ)|ρ > M(τ,ρ)}. 
(2.4a) 
 









∫ ,    (2.5a) 
where the inside integral is over ρ and the outside integral is over π, and in like manner: 
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∫  .  (2.5b) 



















∫ ;π,ρ)dF(π,ρ).  (2.6)   
The corresponding average-welfare function for the ER is irrelevant, because the ER 
plays a fixed policy. 
  Now we substitute these expressions into the first-order conditions (FOC), and we 
have fully modeled PUNE – that is, condition (2) of the definition of PUNE holds by 
construction.    
  The first-order conditions now comprise four equations in six unknowns – the 
four policy unknowns of the Left and Right parties, and the two Lagrangian multipliers x 
and y.   If there is a solution, there will (generically) be, therefore, a two- parameter 
family of solutions.  As we described above, the points in this family or manifold can be 
viewed as corresponding to equilibria associated with different relative bargaining 
strengths of the pairs of factions in the parties L and R. 
  Indeed, we now construct an internal bargaining game between party factions and 
show how to compute the relative bargaining powers of the factions at a PUNE.  Denote 
a PUNE by  , where, recall, (x,y) are the Lagrange multipliers 
displayed in eqns. (1a,1b) above.   We construct a Nash bargaining game.  Suppose that 









































concerning the policy L announces) is that party R wins for sure and L does not 
participate in the election.  Then party L wins a zero vote share and  and the constituents 
of party L endure an average welfare of V .   Then the Nash bargaining game of the 

























where α and 1-α are the bargaining powers of the Opportunists and Militants in Left, 




























substituting, we solve for α: 












L .               (2.7) 
In like manner, the bargaining power for the Opportunists in Right at a PUNE is given 
by: 












L .                      (2.8) 
We shall use these formulae below. 
 
3.  The policy bundle and anti-solidarity effects: Theory 
  Our strategy to compute the two effects of voter xenophobia on the size of the 
public sector will be to estimate the above PUNE model, and then to run two 
counterfactual experiments, which we now describe.   The reader may ask: How can we 
use a model which only specifies a two dimensional manifold of equilibria to predict the 
result in a world with a single observed equilibrium?  The answer is that, fortunately, the 
equilibrium manifold turns out to be highly concentrated in the policy space, so that little 
precision is lost by the fact that there is a continuum of equilibria. We will illustrate this 





































  We will summarize the values of the ‘tax policy’ t that parties propose in 
equilibrium by one average expected policy, that we will define later, which we will 
denote  t
exp.  Our concern is with the effect of xenophobia on the size of public sector (tax 
policy). 
  In the first counterfactual experiment, we assume that immigration policy(r) is not 
an issue in the election.   Parties compete, that is, over the single issue of public-sector 
size, t.    Voters, however, continue to possess exactly the distribution of preferences on 
public sector size as described by (the marginal distribution of) F.  Since those 
preferences are influenced by their views on immigration, it continues to be the case, in 
this counterfactual contest, that voters’ views on immigration will indirectly affect the 
political equilibrium, via their effect on preferences over size of the public sector.   We 
summarize the tax-policy equilibria of the set of PUNEs for this counterfactual election 
by one policy, tI
exp. 
  To compute these equilibria, we exogenously specify a fixed value for the r issue.  
(It does not matter what that value is.)  This counterfactual election is equivalent to an 
election in which voter preferences are altered by setting γ equal to zero.   Thus the 
difference tI
exp − t
exp is exactly a measure of the policy-bundle effect: for in this election, 
there is no portfolio problem for the voter, as immigration policy is not an issue.  
Nevertheless, a voter’s xenophobia will still cause her to vote for a lower size of the 
public sector than otherwise,  if she does not wish to support immigrants with public 
funds.  So the anti-solidarity effect is still active. 
  Next, we estimate (to be described below in section 4) a  distribution of racism-
free demands for the public sector   That is, we estimate what the distribution of 
preferences over public-sector size would be, were all voters non-xenophobic, or not anti-
immigrant.  Call this distribution G.  We next run a second unidimensional election, on 
public-sector size, where we assume the distribution of voter preferences on the tax issue 
is given by G.   The results of this election will be sterilized of both the policy-bundle and 
the anti-solidarity effects.   If we summarize the policy of the PUNEs here calculated by 
tII
exp then we say that the total effect of xenophobic is tII
exp − t









































4. Estimation of model parameters 
 
a. Distribution of voter traits 
 
a(i). Description of the questions and distribution of answers 
In the equilibrium model, parties propose platforms consisting of  an economic issue 
(amount of social expenditures) and an immigration policy. We must select some 
questions  allowing us to estimate voters’ preferences on these two types of issue. Ideally, 
we would like to use identical questions for all three years to see how voters’ opinions on 
these issues have evolved. Unfortunately, very few questions are asked all three years.  
 
The economic issue: 
Question: Can you tell me if the word “privatization” has  a rather positive or negative 
connotation for you?  
Figure 1 presents the distribution of answers.  
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Respondents are quite evenly split into two groups : those with a (quite or very) positive 
opinion about privatization, and those with a negative opinion, the former being slightly 
more numerous. The distribution is quite stable through time, with only a small shift 
towards more negative feelings.  
This question is an indicator of general economic liberalism. Now, to construct an 
index of voters’ preferences on the economic issue, we also want to integrate some more 
specific questions about welfare programs and social security. Unfortunately, the surveys 
are designed in such a way that no such questions are available for all three years.  
For 1988, we use the following question: 
Do you agree with the following statement? The State should guarantee a minimum 
revenue to all households.  





































Can you tell me if the word Solidarity has a rather positive or negative connotation for 
you? 
The distribution of answers is displayed in figure 2. 
 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
  
In all three years, the distributions of answers is very similar. One might be concerned 
that the questions used for the year 1988 on the one hand (support for a minimum income 
for all) and 1995 and  2002 on the other hand (connotation of the word solidarity)  
describe quite different feelings. In particular, the scope of the latter question seems 
much broader, as solidarity need not mean economic solidarity. Yet, it turns out that we 
probably do not err when we take the answers to these two questions as describing the 
same kind of opinions, as we will argue below.   For the time being, we  assume that the 
answer to these questions are a satisfactory proxy for  support for state welfare programs.   
We define voters’ preferences on the economic issue as being some aggregate of 
general economic anti-liberalism and support for welfare programs, as characterized by 
the questions mentioned above. More precisely, we choose to give each answer a score 
on the 0-3 scale (on the anti-privatization scale, the value 0 means a very positive 
connotation of the word privatization, and the value 3 means a very negative connotation 
; on the pro welfare scale, 0 means the lowest possible support, and 3 mean the highest 
possible support). Then, we take the economic view as being the sum of these two scores. 
Neglecting respondents who do not answer either question that is used to construct the 
index, we summarize the results in figure 3. 
 
 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
  
The distribution of views is quite stable through time, with a slight shift in favor of more 








































The immigration  issue: 
Question: There are too many immigrants in France.  
The distribution of answers is shown in figure 4. 
 
[Insert figure 4 about here] 
  
A large majority of respondents think that there are too many immigrants in France. The 
distribution of views is quite stable through time, with a peak of anti-immigrant feeling in 
1995. 
 
Question: Nowadays we do not feel at home as we used to.  
The distribution of answers is shown in figure 5. 
 
[Insert figure 5 about here] 
  
 We use these two questions to define voters’ preferences on the immigration issue. More 
precisely, here again we choose to give each answer a score on the 0-3 scale (on both the 
‘Too many immigrants’ scale and the ‘Do not feel at home’ scales, the value 0 means that 
the respondent strongly disagrees with the statement, and the value 3 means that he/she 
strongly agrees). We take the immigration view as being the sum of these two scores. 
Neglecting respondents who do not answer either question, the distribution of this index 
is given in figure 6. 
 
[Insert figure 6 about here] 
  
The distribution of views is quite stable through time, with a peak of anti-immigration 
feeling in 1995. See appendix tables A8, A9, A10, and A11 for all statistics on the anti-
immigrant variables. 
The correlation between the views on the size of the public sector and the 





































years 1988 and 2002 the distribution of Pro Public Sector views, partitioned by answers 
to the immigration question. The percentage of respondents in the first three categories of 
the pro Public Sector index are small, and so we merge these three categories on the 
graphs.  See figures 7 and 8.  
 
[Insert figures 7 and 8 about here] 
  
 It appears that there is globally a U-shaped relationship between pro-public sector 
opinions and anti-immigration views. People with extreme views on the immigration 
issue (either very negative or very positive) also tend to support higher level of public 
spending. When we consider the first five types of immigration view (from 0 to 4), we 
observe a negative relationship between anti-immigrants feelings and pro public sector 
views. Then the relationship goes the other way. Yet, some striking differences are to be 
noted between 1988 and 2002. In 2002 the negative relationship appears to be much more 
important than in 1988. This is confirmed by the observation of average economic view 
by immigration type for both years.  See figure 9. 
 
[Insert figure 9 about here] 
  
When we consider the evolution of the joint distribution of economic opinions and 
immigration related feelings, the main findings are the following: 
1. The marginal distributions are quite stable through time. One can note a peak in anti- 
immigration feeling in 1995, and a slight increase in the support for more public  sector, 
yet these shifts over time are quite small. 
2. The correlation between these two opinions has changed a lot. In 2002, the globally 
negative relationship is much stronger than in 1988.  
 
a(ii). Interpretation of the variables 
To construct voters’ preferences we rely on a small number of questions only, whereas in 
the survey more questions are available regarding individuals’ opinions on economic 





































possible, we tried to select questions available for all three years). To understand better 
exactly what these variables mean, we check the correlation of our selected variables with 
other related variables. 
In particular, one might be concerned about the changes reported between 1988 
and 2002 in the correlation between the economic views and the immigration views. One 
could argue that this relationship is spurious, and mainly caused by the change in the 
definition of the economic index. Indeed, recall that in 1988, we used a question about 
minimum income for all households, and in 1995 and 2002 we used a question about the 
connotation of the word solidarity.  As we said, it is possible that the word solidarity has 
a broader sense than just economic solidarity, and that people who resent the presence of 
two many immigrants will tend to have negative feelings towards the word solidarity if it 
is  understood as a feeling of fraternity for all people living in France.    Yet, as we shall 
now show,  other questions in the survey provide further evidence for the strong negative 
correlation in 2002 between anti- immigration feelings and support for welfare programs. 
Indeed, in the 2002 survey, the following question about welfare programs is available: 
  
Question: As far as the “Revenu Minimum d’Insertion” is concerned (the RMI is the 
main welfare program in France), would you rather say that  
(1) People may tend to be happy with it and not look for work  
(2) It helps people get through hard times.  
 
57% of the respondents (who indeed answered the question) selected the first answer. A 
majority of people tend to think that welfare programs create strong disincentives to 
work, and that people living on welfare do not try hard to re-enter the labor market. 
Now the correlation between answers to this question and opinions on the immigration 
issue is very large, as shown in figure 10. 
 
[Insert figure 10 about here] 
  
Among people with the most negative feelings towards immigrants, about 75% tend to 





































less than 45% in the most three immigrants-friendly groups. This is to be compared with 
the distribution in 1988 as shown in figure 11. 
 
[Insert figure 11 about here] 
  
In 1988 on the contrary, there is rather a positive – although weak -- relationship between 
anti -immigrant feelings and support for welfare programs. 
Appendix tables A12 and A13  present the correlations between the 
ProPublicSector and AntiImmigrants variables and several other opinions on economic, 
social or cultural issues. The numbers reported in these tables add further evidence to the 
increasing correlation through time between economic views and opinions on the 
immigration issue.  
 
a(iii). Construction of a continuous joint distribution 
Confident that the two variables selected in the first sub-section  are good 
indicators of the preferences we want to estimate, we now proceed to construct a joint 
distribution of voters’ traits. We approximate the joint distribution by a bivariate normal 
density with parameters reported in the table 4.   Figures 3 and 6 suggest that a normal 
approximation is adequate for the distribution of economic views; for the distribution of 
immigration views, the normal fit is not so good for 1995. 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
  
b. Average position by constituency 
In the survey, respondents are also asked which party they voted for in the various 
elections. This allows us to compute the average views on both issues by constituency, as 
defined by the broad coalitions presented above. These average values, which can be 
interpreted as the equilibrium ideal position of the Militants in each party, are reported in  
table 5, for years 1988 and 2002.  
 






































The Extreme Right voters are the most extreme on the immigration issue, but they have 
moderate views on the economic issue, although they are closer to  Right voters than to  
Left voters on that issue. The main differences between  2002 and 1988 are that the L and 
R electorates tend to be closer to one another on the economic issue in 2002, and that the 
ER and the L electorates tend to be further apart on the immigration issue in 2002. 
 
  c. Estimation of counterfactual preferences 
 
As we described in section 3, we want to construct counter-factual xenophobia-
free economic preferences, that is, view points on the size of the public sector that would 
be observed if the hostility towards immigrants and refugees did not reduce the feeling of 
solidarity. There is no obvious procedure for  constructing these preferences.   Our 
approach depends upon how we interpret the large correlation between opinions on the 
size of the public sector and on the immigration issue, on which  evidence has been 
provided (see figures 7 and 8).  
We cannot expect, given the available data, to provide definitive evidence that the 
correlation is indeed a causality -- that is, that xenophobia indeed causes a decrease in the 
support for the public sector -- or to give any final answer as to the exact size of this 
effect. Our goal in this section is less ambitious: it is to provide some weak evidence that 
this correlation remains even when we control for demographic factors, and to provide a 
range of values for the effect.  
As a first approach to computing the potential magnitude of this effect, we begin 
with the most obvious analysis, which is to consider the distribution of economic 
preferences by AntiImmigration view. Table 6 presents the mean and standard deviation 
for various distributions among those whom we class as not xenophobic. 
 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
  
Using  AntiImmigration=0  as the reference non-racist group is probably too extreme. 





































Table 6 only reports correlations. It might be argued that this correlation is the 
indirect result of the existence of common determinants of immigration views and 
economic views. For example, in 2002, age is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant 
feelings and (slightly) positively correlated with support for a larger public sector; see 
figure 12.  
 
[Insert figure 12 about here] 
  
It might be argued that young people tend to be more educated and more open-minded, 
hence less subject to negative stereotypes, which would explain the strong positive 
relationship between age and xenophobia. As to economic views, young people – who 
are severely hurt by unemployment – support a slightly higher level of the public sector 
than older people. On the other hand, some other variables are negatively (or positively) 
correlated with both anti-immigrant views and pro public sector views --for example, 
household income. See figure 13.  
 
[Insert figure 13 about here] 
  
There is a very strong negative relationship between income and xenophobia. Several 
explanations have been put forward to account for this relationship. First, poor 
individuals potentially suffer more from the competition on the job market with low 
skilled immigrants (or at least they so perceive) and live in the same urban 
neighborhoods. Second, poor individuals have lower education, and higher levels of 
education tend to diminish negative stereotypes about foreigners or immigrants. As far as 
the income variable is concerned, note there is only a small negative correlation between 
income and economic views : richer individuals tend to be less favorable to a large public 
sector, but the relation is weak. Views on the size of the public sector depend much more 
on values and opinions about justice than on economic variables.  
To check whether the negative correlation between anti- immigrant feeling and 
support for public sector still obtains when we control for demographics variables, we run 






































[Insert table 7 about here] 
  
In columns (1) and (3), the AntiImmigration variable is significant and attracts the 
expected negative sign. The coefficient is much larger (in absolute value) in 2002 than in 
1988.  Young, female respondents tend to support a larger public sector. Note that, 
somewhat surprisingly, in 2002, opinions about the size of the public sector do not 
depend on income, once all other variables are taken into account. 
So far, we have only controlled for demographic variables such as gender and 
age. But subjective opinions might also be important to determine economic views, in 
particular opinions that people are lazy and do not try hard enough, or that money 
incentives are important. In columns (2) and (4) of table 7, we also control for these 
opinions. Unsurprisingly, respondents who think that people are lazy and that monetary 
incentives are important tend to favor lower tax rates. 
 There is no clear-cut decision as to the exact set of the variables that should 
appear on the right-hand side of the regression. For instance, should we add the variable 
measuring views on “ people are lazy / people on welfare do not try hard enough”, which 
is highly correlated with anti- immigrant views? The answer depends on how we interpret 
the correlation between AntiImmigration and this variable. If we believe that hostility 
towards immigrants and a negative opinion of people who live on welfare are both 
determined by the same psychological or social traits (e.g., some intrinsic general 
distrust), then the variable should be added. On the other hand, it might be argued that 
people who have a rather low opinion of those who live on welfare do so precisely 
because ethnic minorities are over-represented among the unemployed and the poor. In 
that case, including this variable on the right-hand side of the equation is likely to induce 
some under-estimation of the direct influence of AntiImmigration on support for a larger 
public sector.  The question does not have any straightforward answer and is hard to 
settle. 
The figures in table 7 suggest that an increase of 1 point (on the 0 to 6 scale) in 
the level of xenophobia reduces the ProPublicSector by a constant between 0.03 and 0.08 





































construct what we will define as ‘racism-free demands for public sector’. We next 
describe our procedure.  
1. We select a critical level of AntiImmigration ρref  that will be considered as the non-
xenophobic threshold. 
2. For all individuals with AntiImmigration less than or equal to this critical level ρref  , 
we assume that there is no ASE at play, and consider that their observed preferences for 
the public sector are also the ASE-free economic preferences. 
3. For all individuals with AntiImmigration greater than this critical level ρref , we assume 
that there is some ASE at play, and define their ASE-free economic preferences as those 
that they would have, were their AntiImmigration preferences the critical value specified.  
 
More specifically, consider an individual with observed ideal policy  πi and ρi . 
We define his racism- free demand for public sector by :  
πi if ρi ≤ ρref,  
 πi  +δ(ρi − ρref )  if ρi ≥ ρref   
where δ  is the decrease in the support for public sector generated by an increase of one 
point on the xenophobia scale. 
We will consider two different values for ρref  : ρref  = 1  (option 1), ρref  =  2 
(option 2). For each option we present the estimate for two values of δ .  
Table 8 presents the mean and standard deviation of the racism free economic 
preferences for the three options defined above, and the two years under study. The last 
line also presents the figures for observed preferences. 
 
[Insert table 8 about here] 
  
As observed earlier, the ASE effect is much stronger in 2002 than in 1988. Note that the 






































The conclusion of this section is that a reasonable set of distributions of the 
‘racism-free demand for the size of the public sector’ for both years are normal 
distributions with characteristics presented in table 9
5. 
 
[Insert table 9 about here] 
  
5. Political equilibrium: Observation and prediction 
  We computed PUNEs for both 1988  and 2002 for many values of γ.  We report 
the results for  γ=0.35 in 1988, and γ=0.40 in 2002: these values gave us a very good fit 
of the model to the data.   We chose the distribution of types (π,ρ) to be a bivariate 
normal distribution whose parameters are given in section 4. Almost the entire support 
(.998) of the distribution lies in the square [−2,10]×[−2,10]. Figure 14 plots the density 
function for 2002. (The horizontal axis in the figure is π.) 
  We describe the computation of equilibrium PUNEs.  We set the ER policy at the 
average value, for each dimension, of voters who identified with the ER party.    For each 
value of γ, we computed many (approximately twenty) PUNEs
6. Recall that to compute a 
PUNE, we must solve four simultaneous equations in six unknowns, such that two of the 
unknowns, the Lagrangian multipliers, are non-negative. We indeed find many PUNEs, 
as predicted by the theory. 
   In Figures 15 and 16, we graph these PUNEs for 1988 and 2002.  The space of 
the figure is (t,r); consult the legend of figure 15.   Recall, we fix the ER PUNE policy at 
its observed value.  Note that the figures display the weighted average PUNE  for each of 
Right and Left, as well as the average ideal policy of the constituencies of the three 
parties.   (We describe the weights below.) 
                                                 
5 We chose the standard deviations in table 9 to be slightly smaller than observed values 
because we are suppressing some heterogeneity in immigration views by combining the 
three lowest categories. 
6 We do not compute more PUNEs because even this computation requires about twelve 
hours of computer time, for each value of γ.  And we tried many more variations of the 





































  We note that the weighted average PUNEs of the L and R parties are quite close 
in the policy space to the observed ideal policies of the constituencies of those parties.  
This suggests that the model is fitting the data well.  If the Militants had all the 
bargaining power in their expected parties, then we would predict that the L and R parties 
propose in equilibrium exactly the average ideal policies of their constituencies. 
  Nevertheless, the fits are imperfect.  In 1988, note that in PUNEs, Left is more 
extreme on the public-sector policy than its membership – this cannot be accounted for 
by the influence of Opportunists, who would push the party towards a less extreme view 
than its membership’s.  On the immigration issue, the Left in the average PUNE has the 
same policy as its membership.   Right is less extreme on the immigration issue than its 
membership (which could be accounted for by Opportunists in Right trying to take votes 
away from Left); it plays the same policy on the economic issue as its membership’s. 
  In 2002, the observed average policy positions of the L and R memberships are so 
close to the weighted average PUNE values that we hesitate to attribute any significance 
to the differences.  The parties seem to be very close to their members’ views in this year.  
  We remind the reader that our utility function has only one degree of freedom, γ; 
thus, it seems quite remarkable that the model appears to fit the data as well as figures 15 
and 16 show. 
      The set of PUNEs computed for these values of γ are presented in Tables 10 
and 11.   The second and third columns, labeled ‘α’ and ‘β’, present the relative 
bargaining power of the Opportunists at the PUNE, in the L and R parties, respectively, 
as computed from equations (2.7) and (2.8).  A relative bargaining power of 0.5 means 
the factions are equally strong in the bargaining game.   When the relative bargaining 
power is greater (less) than 0.5, then the Opportunists (Militants) are more powerful in 
the party in question.  
 
  The observed vote shares in the 1988 election were  (0.49, 0.365, 0.144) 
respectively for L,R,ER.   The average shares of the parties in the PUNEs in the above 
table are (0.39, 0.35, 0.26).   Thus, we predict that the Left should receive fewer votes, 





































  In 2002, the observed vote shares were for L, R, and ER were (0.429, 0.379, 
0.192).  Compared with 1998, the Left lost substantially and the Extreme Right gained 
substantially.   The average shares in the PUNEs reported in Table 11 for L, R, and ER 
are (0.42, 0.27, 0.31).   This time, we correctly predict  Left’s share, but we predict that 
ER should have more, and R fewer votes than they did in reality.  The common factor of 
these two election years is that we predict the ER should have had a larger vote share 
than it did, and the two major parties in total should have a smaller vote share. 
  We now describe how we computed the average PUNE policies of the parties L 
and R from the computed part of the PUNE manifold.   We did not simply average the 
observed PUNEs.   Rather, we view the PUNE manifold as being parameterized by the 
ordered pairs (α,β), that is, the relative bargaining powers of the Opportunists in L and 
R at the PUNE.   This parameterization corresponds to our view that the missing data, 
which, if we knew it, would fix a particular PUNE, are these relative bargaining powers.   
  Thus, our first step was to estimate a density function of the two relative 
bargaining powers from the computed bargaining powers that we found.   We used kernel 
density estimation.  Figure 17 shows the kernel density function derived from the 
observed bargaining powers of the Opportunists in Left in the 1988 PUNEs, and Figure 
18 shows the analogous kernel density for Right.   The modes of these density functions 
are 0.56 and 0.34 for Left and Right, respectively, indicating that the Opportunists are 
‘usually’ more powerful in Left than in Right.  (We do not know whether this 
corresponds to real perceptions.)    We next weighted each PUNE tax rate (for Left and 
Right) by a factor proportional to the estimated frequency of that PUNE, as measured by 
the kernel density of its bargaining power.    It is the weighted average of the tax rates, so 
computed, that determines what we call the weighted average PUNE, and the 
corresponding large black points, plotted in Figures 15 and 16.  The average vote shares 
for the three parties are also computed using this weighting technique.
7 
                                                 
7 We not that our technique is imperfect.  Ideally, we should compute a kernel density 
function over the two-dimension manifold of ordered pairs of bargaining powers (α,β).  
This would have required computing many more PUNEs.   Our technique computes the 





































  We present these weighted average policies in Table 12. 
  We next display the predicted partition of the space of voter types into the three 
party memberships at the average of the PUNEs in Tables 10 and 11.  Note from 
equations (2.3) and (2.4) that the set of types that prefer one policy to another is the set of 
types below or above a piece-wise linear graph in (π,ρ) space.   In figures 19 and 20 we 
present the partition of voter types into the three party memberships for the average of the  
PUNEs of Tables 10 and 11.   The figures present three regions drawn over a density plot 
of the distribution of voter types: in the density plot, light color means high density.  The 
space is (π,ρ).  All types to the right of the light (green) line comprise Left; all types to 
the Left of the green line comprise Right; all types in the upper region of the figures 
comprise Extreme Right. 
  We remark upon these two figures.   In 1988, for voters whose value of ρ is less 
than 3.5, we observe class politics: these voters choose between the L and R parties, and 
their choice is determined very sharply by their position on the size of the public sector 
(those for whom π< 4 choose Right and those for whom π > 4 choose Left.   On the other 
hand,  those who are xenophobic  (ρ > 3.5) choose either between Right and Extreme 
Right or between Left and Extreme Right, depending on their view on the economic 
issue.  Interestingly, the most xenophobically moderate voters who belong to Extreme 
Right are those whose positions on the size of the public sector are moderate: this is 
because Le Pen proposes a moderate position on the size of the public sector.  Thus, as a 
voter’s position becomes more extreme on public-sector size  ( either more Right or more 
Left) he has to have more incentive to vote for ER.  That incentive must be an 
increasingly radical xenophobic position. 
  In 2002, however, we observe a quite different equilibrium structure of party 
constituencies.   First we no longer have such clear class politics for those who are 
moderate on the immigration issue.  For voters for whom 2.5 < π < 5, we must know both 
their position on immigration and on the public sector to predict whether they identify 
with Left or Right, where the Right attracts the more xenophobic voters.    (That is, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceptually incorrect.   Nevertheless, we believe this method of weighting is superior to 





































green line has a significantly positive slope in Figure 20.)  Second, we observe 
immigration politics in the sense that whether a voter chooses ER, on the one hand, or 
one of the moderate parties, on the other, is quite precisely predicted by his view on 
immigration: if and only if  ρ> 4, the voter chooses Extreme Right. 
  Thus, the important change that we observe, between 1988 and 2002, is the 
increasing salience of the non-economic issue in French politics, and in particular of the 
immigration issue.  Our model probably captures a broader change to a concern with non-
economic issues such as security or law -and -order, as well as immigration.   Indeed, 
voters’ views on the immigration issue and on  the law –and- order issue are strongly 
correlated.   Recall from the introduction that the law-and-order and immigration issues 
became prominent in the 2002 election campaign; compare the ranking of the ‘security’ 
and ‘immigration’ issues in table 2 (for 1995) and table 3 (for 2002). 
  Next, we decompose the vote share going to the three parties,  as a function of the 
voters’ view on the economic question, from the observed data, and from the model.   In 
1988,  Figure 21 decomposes the share of the vote going to L, R, and ER for five values 
of the public-sector question: π ∈{0,1,2},π = 3,π = 4,π = 5, and π = 6.  Table 13 shows 
the predicted vote shares computed from the average PUNE according to the same 
partition of public-sector views.   
 
[Insert figure 21  and table 13 about here] 
 
The predicted and observed shares show a decrease in the R share and increase in the L 
share as π increases, although predicted changes are more extreme than they are in the 
data.  The predicted table also shows a decrease in the share of the ER as π increases, 
something which is not perfectly true in the observed data. 
 
  Figure 22 and Table 14 present the same information for 2002. 
 






































In 2002,  we predict an increase in the Left vote and a decrease in the Right and Extreme 
Right vote as π increases, patterns which also appear in the observed data. 
  Overall, we believe the model performs well, especially given the fact that there is 
only one parameter, γ ,  which we can choose to achieve a good fit.  The main error the 
model makes is its prediction of too large a vote share for the ER party.  This, however, is 
not surprising, for two reasons.  First, many voters are strategic
8,  and hence voters who 
actually prefer the policy of ER may vote for either R or L so that their vote will count (in 
the sense that ER will surely be the third party).   Second, many voters follow family 
tradition in their party identification, and the Le Pen party is a relatively new 
phenomenon.   On this count, our predicted vote shares may be closer to what vote shares 
will be as time passes, and family traditions change. 
  It should also be pointed out that our choice of a two-dimensional space of types, 
H, is a limitation.   Ideally, we would like to differentiate voters as well according to the 
salience they assign to the immigration issue; this would require a three-dimensional type 
space, where a voter’s type would be (π,ρ,γ).   While the theory of PUNEs on such a 
type space is no more complicated than on the two-dimensional type space, the 
computational problems become forbidding, because the equation-solving required for 
computing PUNEs would involve computing three-dimensional numerical integrals, 
instead of two-dimensional integrals.  Given the existing Mathematica software, this is, 
for all practical purposes, infeasible.   We estimate that computing solutions with this 
specification would increase our computation time by an order of magnitude.  As well, 
we would need  reliable data to estimate voters’ saliences, which we do not at this time 
possess. 
   
6.  The policy bundle and anti-solidarity effects: Computation 
  As we described earlier, to compute the ASE and PBE, we perform two 
counterfactual computations. 
                                                 
8 Our PUNE analysis assumes voters are sincere.  We chose not to try to model strategic 





































  In the first counterfactual, we compute PUNEs for a model with two parties, in 
which the policy space is unidimensional , as described in section 3.  We restrict to 
PUNEs in the counterfactual for which the vote share of the L party is between 30% and 
70%.   This can be justified by saying that the Opportunists in either the L or the R party 
would be sufficiently strong to veto any policy which would give their party less than 
30% of the vote.   
  We chose a two-party model for the counterfactual, because, first, it would be 
computationally difficult to find equilibria for three endogenous parties (in the 
counterfactual model, we have no way to set the policy of the ER party exogenously).  
Secondly, were politics indeed unidimensional, it is questionable that an ER party would 
receive an appreciable vote share, so a two-party model is a reasonable counterfactual. 
  Recall from section 3 that, in the first counterfactual, we use the actual 
distribution of voter types, F.   This counterfactual is equivalent to holding an election 
where the government’s position on the immigration issue is fixed, and all voters take it 
to be so.   We again take as the summary statistic the average of weighted tax policies 
found in all PUNEs (for which the shares of both parties are at least 30%).  The weights 
are again computed by estimating a kernel density function for each set of computed 
equilibrium bargaining powers. Denote this value t .  I
exp
 For  the  second counterfactual, which computes the anti-solidarity effect, we 
changed the distribution of voter types to the estimated racism-free distribution, G, 
described in section 4.   In 1988, we took the racism -free distribution to be a normal 
distribution on π with standard deviation 1.25  and mean in the set µ*∈{3.90,4.0,4.10}.   
In 2002, we took the standard deviation to be .90, and the mean to lie in the set 
µ*∈{4.15,4.30,4.45,4.60}.  Thus,  we ran three versions of the second counterfactual 
for 1988 and four versions for 2002. 
  For each counterfactual, we again compute kernel density functions of the 
bargaining powers and take the summary statistic for expected policy on the size of the 
public sector as the appropriate weighted average over all PUNEs found.   Denote this 






































  In the unidimensional models, it remains the case that there is a two-manifold of 
PUNEs.  The policy equilibria live, now, in a two-dimensional space  (one dimension for 
each party), and so the PUNEs pave a region in the plane.  We computed approximately 
200 PUNEs for each version of the counterfactual models. 
  We will not present details of the PUNEs computed in these models, except for 
Figure 23, which presents the kernel density function of Left tax rates, computed in the 
second counterfactual model for 2002 with the hypothetical mean of µ*=4.30.  This 
kernel density function is typical.  As the figure shows,  there is a distribution of tax rates 
with a significant variance (as we should expect from the previous paragraph), whose 
mode is located at approximately 4.6. 
  We now define the PBE and the ASE: 







Clearly the total effect of xenophobia on the size of the public sector is: 
  .  TOT(µ*) = PBE + ASE(µ*) = tII
exp(µ*)− t
exp
Tables 15 and 16 report the results. 
  The appropriate way to think of the size of these effects is in comparison to the 
standard deviation of the distribution of ideal public–sector values (π), which is 1.31 in 
1988 and 1.01 in 2002.   By definition, the PBE is invariant with respect to changes in 
µ*.    In both years, it appears to be of negligible size, although it is larger in absolute 
value and negative in 1988.     Evidently this (the small absolute value) is due to the fact 
that Le Pen puts forth a moderate position on the economic issue, so a vote for the ER is 
not a vote for a small public sector.  The ASE, however, is significant.   In 1988, 
depending on the value of µ*, it ranges between 4% and 18% of one standard deviation 
of the distribution of ideal points on the size of the public sector.    In 2002, however,  
depending upon the value of µ*, it ranges from 7% to 51% of one standard deviation of 
the distribution of ideal points on the size of the public sector.   Evidently, the anti-
solidarity effect has increased substantially in this period, a result which seems consistent 





































the salience of non-economic issues – and of the immigration issue in particular -- over 
this period, and with the data analysis of section 4.  
 
7.   Conclusion 
  Our model of party unanimity Nash equilibrium conceptualizes party competition 
in a fashion that produces political equilibria when the policy space is multi-dimensional, 
and, moreover, predicts that parties propose different policies in equilibrium.  By virtue 
of these features, it is superior to the Downsian model of purely opportunist politics, in 
which equilibria rarely exist if the policy space is multi-dimensional, and to other models 
of political equilibrium with multi-dimensional policy spaces  (e.g., the models of 
Coughlin(1992) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)), which predict that parties propose 
the same policy in equilibrium.  The PUNE model conceptualizes the decision makers in 
parties as having varied interests, concerning winning versus representation, and that the 
factions organizing these disparate interests bargain with each other when facing the 
opposition parties’ platforms. 
  Like all equilibrium models, ours is best viewed as one that describes a political 
system in which preferences of voters are stable.  In periods when voter preferences are 
in flux, we cannot expect the PUNE model to give perfect predictions.  With stable 
constituencies, party entrepreneurs will come to know their constituencies’ interests well, 
and we can expect that those entrepreneurs who wish to represent constituents will do so 
with more precision than when voter preferences are unstable and constituencies are 
shifting.  The evolutionary mechanism by which this occurs may well be that those 
Militants who rise within the party structure are ones who best represent the constituents’ 
interests.   Once ensconced, however, a particular Militant will have a career within the 
party that may last for years or decades.  Thus, in periods of voter-preference flux, the 
established Militants in a party may cease to represent its evolving constituency.  
  We believe this may be the case in France, and so our calculations concerning the 
effect of voter xenophobia on the size of the public sector are ones we would expect to 
hold in the future, if voter preferences remain as they are now, and parties adjust to them 
over time.  We note that, nevertheless, the PUNEs calculated are on average quite close, 





































with these groups.    What is not so well replicated by the model are the vote shares 
accruing to the three party groupings: we predict that the Extreme Right should receive 
more votes, based upon reported voter types.   We conjecture that this discrepancy is due 
to strategic voting and to traditional family identification with the two well-established 
‘parties’ of Left and Right.  
 Our  policy space is only two dimensional.  In actual politics, the policy space has 
many more dimensions.  In particular, it is possible, in reality, to differentiate public-
sector policy towards immigrants from policy towards natives: for example, immigrants 
may receive less favorable treatment with regard to transfer payments than natives, a 
policy advocated by Le Pen. To represent this possibility in our model would require a 
third policy dimension.   With such a third dimension, both the anti-solidarity and policy-
bundle effects should decrease, because presumably parties could then propose to retain 
high public-sector benefits for natives, while reducing them for immigrants
9.    We 
cannot, therefore, predict that the total size of the welfare state will radically fall in 
France
10.   
  Indeed, this point illustrates the necessity for political economists to model 
political competition as occurring over multi-dimensional policy spaces.  Our work 
begins this task, although, as we have just noted, it still falls short of what is desirable.  
The binding constraints, at this point, are the difficulty of computing equilibria in real 
                                                 
9 We commented earlier on the computational and data problems associated with 
increasing the dimension of the type space.   Both kinds of problem also exist with 
respect to increasing the dimension of the policy space.   Moving from our present 2 x 2 
model to a 3 x 3 would require both better opinion data than we have, and faster 
computers. 
10 We contrast this with the United States, where voter racism is directed primarily 
towards African-Americans, who, as citizens, cannot be legally discriminated against, as 
can aliens.  Thus, we would expect the size of the welfare state to be more affected by 
voter racism in the US than by voter xenophobia in France.  See Lee and Roemer (2004) 





































time, when the dimension of the type space and/or policy space is larger than two, and the 
availability of data sets that measure voter opinion in a sufficiently refined way. 
  Given these limitations, our main conclusions are tentative.   They are that: 
•  the immigration issue influences equilibrium on the economic issue (public sector 
size) in a significant way; 
•  French politics have manifested a significant increase of the salience of non-
economic issues – and of the immigration issue in particular -- in the period 1988 
– 2002; 
•  due to Le Pen’s moderate position on the economic issue, there is at present an 
insignificant policy bundle effect in France; 
•  while the anti-solidarity effect reduced the equilibrium ‘expected tax rate’  (that 
is, public sector size) by a small amount in 1988 (between 4% and 18% of one 
standard deviation of the distribution of voter views on public sector size), by 
2002,  it reduced the equilibrium size of the public sector by between 7% and 
51% of one standard deviation on the distribution of public-sector size ideal 
points; 
•  however, these effects will be reduced by the possibility of differentiating benefits 
provided by the state to immigrants and to citizens. 
 
References 
Alesina, Alberto, E. Glaeser, and  B. Sacerdote, 2001.  “Why doesn’t the 
US have a European-style welfare state?”  Brookings paper on Economics 
activities, Fall 2001, 187-278. 
Austen-Smith, D. and M. Wallerstein, 2003. “Redistribution in a divided 
society”, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics 
and Management Science Working Paper 1362. 
Coughlin, P. 1992. Probabilistic Voting Theory, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lee,W. and J.E. Roemer, 2004. “Racism and distribution in the United 
States: A solution to the problem of Amercian exceptionalism,” Cowles 





































Lindbeck. A. and J. Weibull, 1987. “Balanced budget redistribution as the 
outcome of political competition,” Public Choice 52, 273-297. 
Ortega, F., 2004a. “Immigration policy and skill upgrading”, Journal of 
Public Economics, forthcoming.  
Ortega, F., 2004b. “Immigration policy and the welfare state”, mimeo  
New York University. 
Roemer, J.E. 2001. Political Competition, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Roemer, J. E. and K Van der Straeten, 2004.  “The political economy of 
xenophobia and distribution: The case of Denmark », Laboratoire d'Econométrie 








































 1988  1995  2002 
L 49.0 40.6 42.9
R 36.5 44.2 37.9
ER 14.4 15.3 19.2
Table 1. Coalitions’ vote shares 
 
 
  Score 9-10 Score 0-2  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Unemployment 72.9  2.5  8.9  2.0  3897 
Education of the youth  56.8  2.9  8.3  2.2  3881 
Social protection  49.1  3.0  8.0  2.2  3892 
Exclusion 49.3  4.2  7.9  2.4  3853 
Purchasing power and wages  46.1  3.8  7.8  2.3  3883 
AIDS 48.3  9.1  7.5  2.9  3848 
Corruption 46.1  7.5  7.5  2.7  3843 
Security of persons  37.3  7.3  7.2  2.7  3885 
Environment 26.9  6.2  6.8  2.5  3865 
Sharing of working time  29.1  9.2  6.7  2.7  3829 
Immigration 30.6  13.0  6.5  3.0  3864 
Place of France in the world  21.5  9.7  6.4  2.7  8600 
European construction  20.1  11.5  6.2  2.7  3827 
Table 2. The most important problems, year 1995 
 
  #1 #2 #3 All 
Unemployment  33.4 16.8 10.8  61.0
Delinquency  19.6 22.3 14.8  56.7
Social  inequalities  14.0 14.7 9.9  38.6
Immigration  6.5 6.2 5.7  18.4
Pensions  5.5 8.8 12.7  27.0
Pollution  5.4 5.5 7.1  18.0
Schools    3.4 6.0 6.6  16.0
Tax  cuts  3.1 5.6 9.5  18.2
Fight against terrorism  2.8  4.6  7.5  14.9
Political  scandals  2.1 3.3 4.4  9.8
European  construction  2.0 3.0 5.1  10.1
Sovereignty  of  France  1.1 1.2 2.0  4.3
Do not answer  1.3  2.0  3.9  7.2
Note: Problems are ranked by number people who rank this specific problem as the single most important 
problem.  
Total number of observations: 4,107 
 






































 1988  1995  2002 
  Mean St  Dev  Mean St  Dev  Mean St  Dev 
AntiImmigrant      3.48 1.87 3.79 1.93 3.36 1.84 
ProPubSector      3.86  1.31  3.91  1.10  4.06  1.01 
Correlation -0.05  -0.25  -0.25 
Table 4. Parameters of the joint distribution of voters’ views 
 
 
1988  L voters  R voters  ER voters  All 
Mean ProPublicSector  4.30 3.16 3.62 3.86 
Mean AntiImmigrants  2.93 3.75 4.99 3.48 
 
2002  L voters  R voters  ER voters  All 
Mean ProPublicSector  4.48 3.66 3.84 4.06 
Mean AntiImmigrants  2.25 3.28 5.04 3.36 
 
Table 5. Voters’ average views by constituency 
 
 1988  2001 
ProPublicSector  Mean  St dev  Obs.  Mean  St dev  Obs. 
AntiImmigration=0  4.35 1.25 291 4.68 0.96 308 
AntiImmigration=1  3.90 1.26 267 4.43 0.90 360 
AntiImmigration=2  3.86 1.22 395 4.18 0.91 541 
AntiImmigr=0,1,2  4.02 1.26 953 4.38 0.93 1209 
All  3.86 1.31 3156  4.06 1.01 3602 
 







































 1988  2002 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 



























































French people are lazy 
(1988) /  People on welfare 
do not try to work (2002) 
  -0.273***
(0.025) 
   -0.259*** 
(0.038) 
Money incentives are 
important to make people 
work (1988) / Financial 
helps should be withdrawn 
from families where 
children are delinquent 
(2002) 
  -.137*** 
(0.023) 
















Obs.  2971 2715 2569 3475 3475  3182 
R-squared  0.0022 0.0661 0.1271 0.0621 0.0674  0.0889 
 






































 1988  2002 
  Mean   Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev. 
Option 1, δ =0.03 in 1988 /δ =0.10 in 2002 3.91 1.30 4.22 1.00 
Option 1, δ =0.08 in 1988 /δ =0.15 in 2002 3.99 1.31 4.30 0.99 
Option 2, δ =0.03 in 1988 /δ =0.10 in 2002 3.93 1.30 4.25 0.99 
Option 2, δ =0.08 in 1988 /δ =0.15 in 2002 4.06 1.30 4.42 0.98 
Observed  preferences  3.86 1.31 4.06 1.01 
 
Table 8. Parameters of the distributions of  counterfactual xenophobia-free economic 
preferences, based on multivariate regression analysis 
 
 1988  2002 
ProPubSector  Mean St  Dev  Mean St  Dev 
   observed  3.86  1.31  4.06  1.01 
counterfactual  3.90 1.25 4.15 0.90 
  4.00 1.25 4.30 0.90 
  4.10 1.25 4.45 0.90 
















































       (t,r)  1988 2002 
L  (4.69, 2.95)  (4.40, 2.53) 
R  (3.20, 3.32)  (3.78, 3.39) 
ER  (3.62, 4.99)  (3.84, 5.04) 
 
Table 12.  Weighted average policies of L and R, and observed average policies of ER, 




Table 13. Distribution of vote share according to public-sector view, predicted from 
PUNE, Year 1988 
 
 




µ*  ASE PBE Total  effect 
3.9 .057  -.051  .006 
4.0 .128  -.051  .077 
4.1 .228  -.051  .177 




µ*  ASE PBE Total  effect 
4.15  .0719 .0075 .0794 
4.30  .2163 .0075 .2238 
4.45  .3742 .0075 .3817 
4.60  .5169 .0075 .5244 



























































Figure 1. Connotation of the word “privatization”, Distribution of answers 
 
State should provide minimum income for all 
(1988)


































































Figure 2. The State should provide minimum income for all (1988) / Connotation of the 







































































Figure 4. There are too many immigrants in France, distribution of answers 






































































Figure 6. Distribution of anti-immigration views 
Distribution of Pro Public Sector views 
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Distribution of Pro Public Sector views
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Figure 8. Distribution of Pro Public Sector views  by Anti Immigration views, Year 2002 
 
 
Average Pro Public Sector view 






















































Opinions on welfare programs 










people go through hard
times
People on welfare do not
try to work
 
Figure 10. Opinions on welfare programs by Anti Immigration type, Year 2002 
 
 
The state should provide income for all















Figure 11. The State should provide income for all, Distribution of answers by anti 






































Average economic and immigration 





















Figure 12. Average economic and immigration views by age groups, year 2002 
 
Average economic and immigration 


























































Figure 15. 1988 PUNEs.  The green dots are Right, the red dots are Left, the three small 
black dots are the average policies of the observed party constituencies, and the two 























































































Figure 19. Partition of the type space into party memberships, average PUNE, 1988. The 
three regions, reading from the left and proceeding counter-clockwise, are Right, Left, 
and Extreme Right.   
 
































































Figure 22. Party vote shares by economic view, observed 
 















































Number of Registered voters  38,179,118  38,168,869 
Total number of ballots  31,059,300  32,085,071 
Number of valid ballots  30,436,744  30,923,249 
Abstention (in percentage)  18.6%  15.9% 
 
 First  round  Second  round 





10,381,332 34.1 16,704,279 54.0 L
J. Chirac 
(Rassemblement Pour la 
République) 
6,075,160 20.0 14,218,970 46.0 R
R. Barre 
(Union pour la 
Démocratie Française) 
5,035,144 16.5  R
J.-M. Le Pen 
(Front National) 
4,376,742 14.4  ER
A. Lajoinie 
(Parti Communiste) 
2,056,261 6.7  L
A. Waechter 
(Verts) 
1,149,897 3.8  L
P. Juquin 
(Parti Communiste Diss.) 
639,133 2.1  L
A. Laguiller  
(Lutte Ouvrière) 
606,201 2.0  L
P. Boussel 
(Parti des Travailleurs) 
116,874 0.4  L
 
























































Number of Registered voters  39,993,954  39,976,944 
Total number of ballots  31,346,960  31,845,819 
Number of valid ballots  30,464,552  29,943,671 
Abstention (in percentage)  21.62  20.34 
 
 First  round  Second  round 





7,098,191 23.30 14,180,644 47.4 L
J. Chirac 
(Rassemblement Pour la 
République) 
6,348,696 20.84 15,763,027 52.6 R
E. Balladur 
(Union pour la 
Démocratie Française) 
5,658,996 18.58  R
J.-M. Le Pen 
(Front National) 
4,571,138 15.00  ER
R. Hue 
(Parti Communiste) 
2,632,936 8.64  L
A. Laguiller 
(Lutte Ouvrière) 
1,615,653 5.30  L
P. de Villiers 
(Mouvement pour la 
France) 
1,443,235 4.74  R
D. Voynet 
(Verts) 
1,010,738 3.32  L
J. Cheminade 
(Solidarité et progrès) 
84,969 0.28  ER
 















































Number of Registered voters  41,194,689 41,191,151 
Total number of ballots  29,495,733 32,831,501 
Number of valid ballots  28,498,471 31,066,781 
Abstention (in percentage)  28.40 20.29 
 
  First round  Second round 




(Rassemblement Pour la 
République) 
5,665,855 19.88 25,540,874 82.21 R
J.-M. Le Pen 
(Front National) 
4,804,713 16.86 5,525,907 17.79 ER
L. Jospin 
(Parti Socialiste) 
4,610,113 16.18  L
F. Bayrou 
(Union pour la Démocratie 
Française) 
1,949,170 6.84  R
A. Laguiller 
(Lutte Ouvrière) 
1,630,045 5.72  L
J.-P. Chevènement 
(Mouvement des Citoyens) 
1,518,528 5.33  L
N. Mamère 
(Verts) 
1,495,724 5.25  L
O. Besancenot 
(Ligue Communiste Rév.) 
1,210,562 4.25  L
J. Saint-Josse 
(Chasse Pêche Nature et 
Tradition) 
1,204,689 4.23  R
A. Madelin 
(Démocratie Libérale) 
1,113,484 3.91  R
R. Hue 
(Parti Communiste) 




667,026 2.34  ER
C. Taubira 
(Parti Radical de Gauche) 
660,447 2.32  L
C. Lepage 
(CAP 21) 
535,837 1.88  R
C. Boutin 
(Union pour la Démocratie 
Française) 
339,112 1.19  R
D. Glückstein 
(Parti des Travailleurs) 
132,686 0.47  L






































 1988  1995  2002 
Very  positive  11.1  13.9  8.8 9.8 4.1 4.7 
Quite  positive  32.5 40.9 40.5 45.2 41.4 47.1 
Quite  negative  25.2 31.8 29.4 32.9 33.7 38.4 
Very  negative  10.6 13.4 10.8 12.1 8.6  9.1 
Do not answer  20.7    10.4    12.1   
Obs.  4,032 3,199 4,078 3,652 4,107 3,609 
Mean  (scale  0-3)    1.45   1.47   1.53 
St. Dev. (scale 0-3)    0.89    0.83    0.73 
Question: Does the word “privatization” have a positive or negative connotation for you ? 
 
Table A4. Distribution of Economic Anti Liberalism 
 
 1988  1995  2002 
Strongly disagree / Very negative 3.6  3.7  2.2  2.2  1.1  1.1 
Rather disagree / Quite negative  6.7  6.8  7.2  7.3  4.9  4.9 
Rather agree / Quite positive   31.5  32.1  34.8  54.2  34.2  34.5 
Strongly agree / Very positive  56.2  57.4  54.7  55.3  58.9  59.4 
Do not answer  2.0    1.1    0.9   
Obs.  4,032 3,952 4,078 4,031 4,107 4,069 
Mean  (scale  0-3)    2.43   2.43   2.52 
St. Dev. (scale 0-3)    0.78    0.72    0.65 
Question: The State should guarantee a minimum revenue to all households. (1988) 
Does the word “solidarity” have a positive or a negative connotation for you ? (1995, 
2002) 
 




 1988  1995  2002 
Correlation Anti Liberalism / Pro Welfare  0.19  -0.01  0.06 
Obs. 3,156  3,633  3,602 
 
Table A6. Correlation between Anti Liberalism and Support for Welfare 
 
 
  1988 1995 2002 
0  1.0 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 
1  3.1 3.9 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.9 
2  6.3 8.1 6.3 7.1 3.5 3.9 
3  18.0 22.9 23.9 26.8 20.2 23.1 
4  25.0 31.9 32.2 36.2 34.4 39.3 





































6  7.8 1.0 7.0 7.9 6.2 7.0 
No  answer  21.7   10.9   12.3  
Obs.  4,032 3,156 4,078 3,633 4,107 3,602 
Mean   3.86   3.91   4.06 
St  Dev   1.31   1.10   1.01 
 
Table A7. Distribution of Economic views 
 
 
 1988  1995  2002 
Strongly  disagree  13.2 14.0 10.6 10.8 15.7 16.1 
Rather  disagree  16.2 17.2 14.1 14.3 21.7 22.3 
Rather  agree  29.9 31.7 32.4 33.0 30.0 30.8 
Strongly  agree  34.9 37.1 41.0 41.8 30.0 30.0 
Do not answer  5.8    1.9    2.5   
Obs.  4,032 3,796 4,078 4,000 4,107 4,003 
Mean  (scale  0-3)    1.92   2.06   1.76 
St. Dev. (scale 0-3)    1.05    1.00    1.06 
Question: There are too many immigrants in France. 
 
Table A8. Distribution of views about the number of immigrants 
 
 
 1988  1995  2002 
Strongly  disagree  23.5 24.4 19.9 20.4 16.0 16.4 
Rather  disagree  23.8 24.6 21.5 22.0 29.8 30.6 
Rather  agree  22.6 23.4 23.3 23.8 30.4 31.3 
Strongly  agree  26.7 27.6 33.0 33.8 21.3 21.9 
Do not answer  3.4    2.3    2.4   
Obs.  4,032 3,893 4,078 3,984 4,107 4,007 
Mean  (scale  0-3)    1.54   1.71   1.58 
St. Dev. (scale 0-3)    1.13    1.14    1.00 
Question: Nowadays, we do not feel at home as we used to. 
 
Table A9. Distribution of feelings whether one feels at home. 
 
 
 1988  1995  2002 
Correlation Too many immigrants / Do not feel at home   0.46  0.64  0.58 
Obs. 3,689  3,919  3,919 
 








































  1988 1995 2002 
0  8.0 8.7 7.8 8.1 8.0 8.4 
1  7.8 8.5 6.8 7.1 9.5 10.0 
2  11.9 13.0 11.0 11.5 14.5 15.2 
3  17.0 18.5 13.4 13.9 15.8 16.5 
4  15.9 17.3 15.9 16.6 17.8 18.7 
5  13.9 15.2 15.6 16.2 15.2 16.0 
6  17.1 18.7 25.5 26.6 14.5 15.2 
No  answer  8.5   3.9   4.6  
Obs.  4,032 3,689 4,078 3,919 4,107 3,919 
Mean   3.48   3.79   3.36 
St  Dev   1.87   1.93   1.84 
 










































Economic issues     
The French do not work hard enough. 
 
-0.19 +0.20 
If everybody earned the same amount of money, they would 
have no incentive to work. 
-0.14 +0.13 
Whether children perform well at school or not depends more 
on their social background than on their own skills.  
+0.05 +0.05 
When speaking about someone who made a fortune in a few 
years, do you rather feel admiration or distrust? 
-0.13 -0.04 
To face economic hardships, do you think that the State should 
trust private firms and give them more freedom or rather 
impose more controls and regulation on them? 
+0.60 -0.02 
Can you tell me if the word profit have rather a positive 
connotation for you?  
-0.18 +0.03 
Can you tell me if the word stock exchange have rather a 
positive connotation for you? 
-0.19 0.00 
Can you tell me if the word nationalizations have rather a 
positive connotation for you? 
+0.28 -0.19 
Can you tell me if the word firm have rather a positive 
connotation for you? 
-0.15 -0.03 
The “Impôt sur les grandes fortunes” (a tax paid only by very 
wealthy households) should be reenacted.  
+0.40 -0.09 
If the social security system was suppressed, would you say 
that it would be very terrible, quite terrible, somewhat terrible 
or not a problem at all?  
+0.18 -0.02 
Immigration issues    
Jews have too much power in France. 
 
+0.08 +0.48 
Muslims living in France ought to have mosques to practice 
their cult. 
+0.02 +0.44 
Law and order / Society issues    
Death penalty should be reenacted. 
 
+0.00 +0.56 
In a society, one needs hierarchy and chiefs. 
 
-0.09 +0.28 
Homosexuality is morally condemnable. 
 
-0.02 +0.28 
The role of women is before anything else to have children 
and raise them. 
+0.03 +0.32 
Table A12. Correlation of opinions variables with Pro-Public-Sector and Anti-












































Economic issues     
(1) Firms should have the right to hire or fire depending on the 
situation (2) Firms should undergo control by the state before 
being allowed to fire. Do you agree most with (2)? 
+0.22 -0.02 
(1) People may tend to be happy with the “Revenu Minimum 
d’Insertion” (a welfare benefit) and not look for work. (2) It 
helps people go through hard times.Do you agree most with (2)?
+0.20 -0.33 
The number of civil servants should be reduced. Do you agree? 
 
-0.26 +0.16 
The word profit has rather a positive connotation for you. 
 
-0.30 +0.10 
The SNCF (national railway company) would work better if I 
were privatized. Do you agree with this statement? 
-0.31 +0.25 
Immigration issues    
The presence of immigrants in France is an opportunity of 
cultural enrichment.  
+0.19 -0.59 
Some races are less gifted than others. 
 
-0.17 +0.49 
Jews have too much power in France. 
 
-0.14 +0.42 
Can you tell me if the word Islam have rather a positive 
connotation for you?  
+0.12 -0.45 
Can you tell me if the word United States has rather a positive 
connotation for you?  
-0.18 +0.17 
In France, the Black and Maghibi are too often treated as second 
order citizens. 
+0.19 -0.34 
Law and order / Society issues    
Death penalty should be reenacted. 
 
-0.24 +0.54 
In a society, one needs hierarchy and chiefs. 
 
-0.14 +0.28 
To fight against delinquency, family benefits should be 
withdrawn from families with juvenile delinquents.  
-0.20 +0.44 
Can you tell me if the word “Authority” has rather a positive or 
negative connotation for you? 
-0.07 +0.22 
Same sex couples should have a right to adopt children. 
 
+0.13 -0.26 
Homosexuality is an acceptable way of living one’s sexuality. 
 
+0.12 -0.29 
Table A13. Correlation of opinion variables with Pro-Public-Sector and Anti-
Immigration, Year 2002. 
 
h
a
l
-
0
0
2
4
2
9
3
4
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
6
 
F
e
b
 
2
0
0
8